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Abstract. This paper provides an informal discussion of the formal as-
pects of software doping.
1 Introduction
Software is the great innovation enabler of our times. Software runs on hardware.
Usually, software is licensed to the hardware owner, instead of being owned by
her. And while the owner is in full physical control of the hardware, she usually
has neither physical nor logical control over the software. That software however
does not always exploit the offered functionality of the hardware in the best
interest of the owner. Instead it may be tweaked in various manners, driven by
interests different from those of the owner or of society. This situation may be
aggravated if the software is not running on local hardware but remotely (e.g. in
the cloud) since the software user has now little or no control of its execution.
There is a manifold of facets to this phenomenon, summarised as software
doping. It becomes more widespread as software is embedded in ever more de-
vices of daily use. Yet, we are not aware of any systematic investigation or
formalisation from the software engineering perspective.
This paper reviews known real cases of software doping, and provides a con-
ceptual account of characteristic behaviour that distinguishes doped from clean
software.
2 Software Doping in the Wild
The simplest and likely most common example of software doping is that of ink
printers [4] refusing to work when supplied with a toner or ink cartridge of a
third party manufacturer [8], albeit being technically compatible. More subtle
variations of this kind of doping just issue a warning message about the risk
of using a “foreign” cartridge [11]. In the same vein, it is known that printers
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emit “low toner” warnings [12] earlier than needed, so as to drive or force the
customer into replacing cartridges prematurely. Similarly, cases are known where
laptops refuse to charge [3] the battery if connected to a third-party charger.
Characteristic for these examples is that the functionality in question is in
the interest of the device manufacturer, but against the customer interest. How-
ever, there are also variations of software doping that can be considered to be in
the interest of the customer, but not in the interest of society: In the automotive
sector, “chip-tuning” [19] is a remarkable variation of the software doping phe-
nomenon, where the owner initiates a reprogramming of some of the vehicle’s
electronic control units (ECU) so as to change the vehicle characteristics with
respect to power, emissions, or fuel consumption. By its nature, chip-tuning
appears to be in the owner’s interest, but it may well be against the interest
of society, for instance if legally-defined and thus built-in speed limitations are
overridden. Examples include scooters [9] and electric bikes [2] [10].
Some cases of software doping are clearly neither in the interest of the cus-
tomer, nor in the interest of society. This includes as prominent examples the
exhaust emission scandal of Volkswagen [20] (and other manufacturers). Here,
the exhaust software was manufactured in such a way that it heavily polluted the
environment, unless the software detected the car to be fixed on the particular
test setup used to determine the NOx footprint data officially published.
The same sort of behaviour has been reported in the context of smart phone
designs [7], where software was tailored to perform better when detecting it
was running a certain benchmark, and otherwise running in lower clock speed.
Another smart phone case, disabling the phone [5] via a software update after
“non-authorized” repair, has later been undone [1]. Often, software doping is a
part of a lock-in strategy: The customer gets locked-in on the manufacturer or
unit-supplier for products, maintenance and services [13].
3 Characterising Software Doping
It is difficult to come up with a crisp characterisation of what constitutes soft-
ware doping. Nevertheless we consider it a worthwhile undertaking to explore
this issue, with the intention to eventually enable a formal characterisation of
software doping. That characterisation can be the nucleus for formulating and
enforcing rigid requirements on embedded software driven by public interest, so
as to effectively ban software doping. In order to sharpen our intuition, we offer
the following initial characterisation attempt.
(1)A software system is doped if the manufacturer has included a hidden
functionality in such a way that the resulting behaviour intentionally
favors a designated party, against the interest of society or of the soft-
ware licensee.
So, a doped software induces behaviour that can not be justified by the
interest of the licensee or of society, but instead serves another usually hidden
interest. It thereby favors a certain brand, vendor, manufacturer, or other market
participant. This happens intentionally, and not by accident.
However, the question whether a certain behaviour is intentional or not is
very difficult to decide. To illustrate this, we recall that the above mentioned
iPhone-6 case, where “non-authorized” repair rendered the phone unusable [5]
after an iOS update, seemed to be intentional when it surfaced, but was actually
tracked down to a software glitch of the update and fixed later. Notably, if
the iOS designers would have had the particular intention to mistreat licensees
who went elsewhere for repair, the same behaviour could well have qualified as
software doping in the above sense (1).
As a result, we will look at software doping according to the above char-
acterisation, but without any attempt to take into account considerations of
intentionality.
In the sequel, we shall investigate this phenomenon by synthetic examples,
that however are directly inspired by the real cases of software doping reviewed
above.
3.1 Doping by discrimination
procedure Printer(cartridge info)
read(document)
while pagesToPrint(document) > 0 do
read(paper available?)
if ¬paper available? then
turnOn(alert signal)
waitUntil(paper available?)
turnOff(alert signal)
end if
printNextPage(page out,document)
end while
end procedure
Fig. 1. A simple printer.
procedure Printer(cartridge info)
if brand(cartridge info) = my-brand then
(· · · same code as Fig. 1 · · · )
else
turnOn(alert signal)
end if
end procedure
Fig. 2. A doped printer.
Think of a program as a func-
tion that accepts some ini-
tial parameters and, given (par-
tial) inputs, it produces (par-
tial) outputs. As an example,
(an abstraction of) the embed-
ded software in a printer is
given in Fig. 1. The program
Printer has the parameter
cartridge info (which is not yet
used within the function), two
input variables (document and
paper available?) and two out-
put variables (alert signal and
page out).
A printer manufacturer may
manipulate this program in or-
der to favor its own cartridge
brand. An obvious way is dis-
played in Fig. 2. This is a sort of
discrimination based on parame-
ter values. Therefore, a first for-
mal approach to characterising
a program as clean (or doping-
free) is that it should behave in a similar way for all parameter values, where by
similar behaviour we mean that the visible output should be the same for any
procedure Printer(cartridge info)
read(document)
if ¬newType(document) ∨ supportsNewType(cartridge info) then
(· · · proceed to print as in Fig. 1 · · · )
else
turnOn(alert signal)
end if
end procedure
Fig. 3. A clean printer.
given input in two different instances of the same (parameterized) program. Ob-
viously, “all parameter values” refers to all values within a given domain. In the
case of the printer, we expect that it works with any compatible cartridge. Such
compatibility domain defines a first scope within which a software is evaluated
to be clean or doped. So, we could say the following.
(2)A program is clean (or doping-free) if for every standard parameter it
exhibits the same visible outputs when supplied with the same inputs.
Under this view, the program of Fig. 2 is indeed doped. Also, note that this char-
acterisation entails the existence of a contract which defines the set of standard
parameters.
3.2 Doping vs. extended functionality
We could imagine, nonetheless, that the printer manufacturer may like to pro-
vide extra functionalities for its own product which is outside of the standard
for compatibility. For instance (and for the sake of this discussion) suppose the
printer manufacturer develops a new file format that is more efficient at the time
of printing, but this requires some new technology on the cartridge. The man-
ufacturer still wants to provide the usual functionality for standard file formats
that works with standard compatible cartridges and comes up with the program
of Fig. 3. Notice that this program does not conform to the specification of a
clean program given by (2) since it behaves differently when a document of the
new (non-standard) type is given. This is clearly not in the spirit of the pro-
gram in Fig. 3 which is actually conforming to the standard specification. Thus,
we relax the previous characterisation and only require that two instances of
the program behave similarly if the provided inputs adhere to some expected
standard. Therefore we propose the following weaker notion of clean program:
(3)A program is clean if for every standard parameter it exhibits the same
visible outputs when supplied with any possible input complying with
a given standard.
This characterisation is based on a comparison of the behaviour of two in-
stances of a program, each of them responding to different parameter values.
A second, different characterisation may instead require to compare a reference
specification capturing the essence of clean behaviour against any possible in-
stance of the program. The first approach seems more general than the second
one in the sense that the specification could be considered as one of the possible
instances of the (parameterized) program. However, the second characterisation
is still reasonable and it could turn to be equivalent to (3) under mild conditions
(namely, under behavioural equivalence.)
3.3 Doping by switching
procedure EmissionControl()
read(throttle)
def dose = SCRModel(throttle)
end procedure
Fig. 4. A simple emission control.
Let us draw the reader’s attention to
a different facet of software doping. We
consider the ECU of a diesel vehicle, in
particular its exhaust emission control
module. For diesel engines, the controller
injects a certain amount of a specific fluid
(an aqueous urea solution) into the ex-
haust pipeline in order to lower NOx emissions. We simplify this control prob-
lem to a minimal toy example. In Fig. 4 we display a function that reads the
throttle position and calculates which is the dose of diesel exhaust fluid (DEF)
that should be injected to reduce the NOx emission (this is stored in def dose).
Variable throttle is an input variable while, though def dose is an output vari-
able, it is not the actual visible output. The actual visible output is the NOx
emission measured at the end of the exhaust system. Therefore, the behaviour
of this system needs to be analyzed through testing. In this setting, we may
only consider the standard input behaviour as the one defined in the laboratory
emission tests.
procedure EmissionControl()
read(throttle)
if throttle ∈ throttleTestValues then
def dose = SCRModel(throttle)
else
def dose = alternateSCRModel(throttle)
end if
end procedure
Fig. 5. A doped emission control.
The Volkswagen emis-
sion scandal arose precisely
because their software was
instrumented so that it
works as expected only if
operating in or very close
to the lab testing condi-
tions [6]. For our simpli-
fied example, this behaviour
is exemplified by the algo-
rithm of Fig. 5. Of course, the real case was less simplistic. Notably, a software
like this one still meets the caracterization of clean given in (3). However, it is
intentionally programmed to defy the regulations when being unobserved and
hence it falls directly within our intuition of what a doped software is (see (1)).
The spirit of the emission tests is to verify that the amount of NOx in the car
exhaust gas does not exceed a given threshold in general. Thus, one would ex-
pect that if the input values of the EmissionControl function deviates within
“reasonable distance” from the standard input values provided during the lab
emission test, the amount of NOx found in the exhaust gas is still within the
regulated threshold, or at least it does not exceed it more than a “reasonable
amount”. Similar rationale could be applied for regulation of other systems such
as speed limit controllers in scooters and electric bikes. Therefore, we propose
this alternative characterisation:
(4)A program is clean if for every standard parameter, whenever it is sup-
plied with any input (being it complying to the standard or not) that
deviates within “reasonable distance” from a given standard input, it
exhibits a visible output which does not deviate beyond a “reasonable
distance” from the specified output corresponding to such standard
input.
The “reasonable distances” are values that should be provided (together with
the notion of distance) and are part of the contract that ensures that the software
is clean. Also, the limitation to this “reasonable distance” has to do with the fact
that, beyond it, particular requirements (e.g. safety) may arise. For instance, a
smart battery may decide to stop accepting charge if the current emitted by
a standardized but foreign charger is higher than “reasonable”, but it may still
proceed in case it is instead dealing with a charger of the same brand for which it
may know that it can resort to a customized protocol allowing ultra-fast charging
in a safe manner.
These ’reasonable distances’ need to come with application-specific metrics
on possible input and output values. Since these metrics are often related to real
physical quantities, the metric spaces might be continuous. They might also be
discrete, or superpositions of both.
Characterisation (4) also plays a role when inputs and outputs cannot be
precisely defined. This situation arises in cases like the exhaust emission system
and almost any embedded system: input and output values will be as precise as
sensors and actuators allow. In this case, the “reasonable distance” is going to
be defined according to the precision of these devices.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has reviewed facets of software doping. Starting off from real exam-
ples a first intuitive characterisation of software doping was derived. We then
discussed a sequence of – still informal — definitions of absence of software
doping.
We are currently working on the formalisation of these definitions. We ex-
pect that many definitions will fall in the general class of hyperproperties [15]—
informally, hyperproperties are sets of sets of program executions and capture
behaviours of multiple runs of a program—which encompasses continuity [14]
and non-interference [16, 18]. These formal characterisations are expected to
help to understand better the requirements on embedded software imposed by
public interest, hence providing a framework to specify contracts or regulations
pertaining to such technology, and to rigorously discriminate between doping
and reasonably acceptable deviations from the normal behaviour. They will also
help clarify the specificities of software doping with respect to malware, software
sabotage, and substitution attacks that have been studied in the context of secu-
rity [17]. Furthermore, rigorous definitions will provide the necessary foundations
for developing analysis methods (verification or testing) against doping.
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